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INSURANCE LAW
by
Jeff Dykes* and Otway B. Denny, Jr. **

I.

LIABILITY INSURANCE

PersonalInjury Protection Coverage. One case during the survey period
focused on the scope of coverage under the personal injury protection coverage. In Slocum v. UnitedPacificInsurance Co. I suit was brought by Slocum against his automobile insurer under the personal injury protection
clause of his automobile policy. Slocum fractured his hand and sued for
lost wages. The evidence showed that the injury occurred on May 23,
1975, some two days before he was to report to work for Burmah Oil Company. The court submitted an issue and instruction based upon language
in the policy. 2 The jury answered "we do not" to this issue. Based upon
judgment for the insurance company
this finding the trial court entered
3
denying recovery to the insured.
The plaintiff on appeal contended that the instructions and policy lan4
guage were more restrictive in scope than authorized by the legislature
and were thus void. The court noted that the plaintiff brought suit on an
insurance contract and his pleadings failed to give notice that he was contending that the policy provisions were void. The court ruled that the trial
court did not err in using the policy language in its instruction since it was
provided for in the policy.5 In dictum, however, the court said that the
phrase "at the time of the accident" should not be construed so narrowly
as to deny a recovery to one who had commenced earning income but was
injured on a day that he was not working and suggested an instruction that
* B.A., M.A., Stanford University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas.

** B.A., Texas A&M University; J.D. Baylor University. Attorney at Law, Fulbright
& Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
The authors gratefully acknowlodge the assistance of Marc Young, law student, University of Houston School of Law, in the preparation of this Article.
1. 615 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
2. The issue and instruction were as follows:

"Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Randy Slocum was
an income or wage producer on May 23, 1975, the date of this accident?
You are instructed that a wage or income producer is defined as a person
who at the time of the accident was in an occupational status, where such
person was earning or producing income."
Id. at 808-09.
3. Id. at 808-09.
4. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3 (Vernon 1981).
5. 615 S.W.2d at 810.
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could be used in those circumstances. 6 Nevertheless, because Slocum had
of his accident, he was precluded from
not yet begun work at the time
7
recovering under his policy.
UnderinsuredMotorist Coverage. American GeneralFire& Casualty Co. v.
Oestreichs involved the construction of article 5.06-1, section 1 of the
Texas Insurance Code, which concerns underinsured motorist coverage. 9
The plaintiff and two passengers in her automobile were injured as a result
of a collision with an automobile driven by Dowdle and caused by his
negligence. Dowdle's liability policy provided coverage of $10,000 per
person and $20,000 per accident. Although Ms. Oestreich's damages exceeded $20,000, plaintiffs settled their claim against Dowdle for $9,750.
The remainder of the $20,000 of Dowdle's insurance was reserved for the
two passengers in the plaintiffs vehicle. The underinsured provision of the
plaintiff's policy with American General provided for liability of $10,000
per person and $20,000 per accident.10 The carrier contended that the
terms of the policy clearly provided that the $9,750 be subtracted from the
$10,000. Plaintiffs contended that the $9,750 should be subtracted from
the total damages the plaintiffs were entitled to recover from the tortfeasor
and that the difference recoverable was up to and including $10,000.
The court, in interpreting the language in the policy, stated that the
word "reduced" contained in section 511 modified the phrase "an amount
up to the limit specified in the policy," rather than modifying the opening
phrase "payment to the insured of all sums which he shall be legally enti6. The instruction suggested was: "You are instructed that one does not have to be at
work at the time of the accident to be in an occupational status." Id.
7. Id.
8. 617 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, no writ).
9. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1(1) (Vernon 1981) provides:
No automobile liability insurance (including insurance issued pursuant to
an Assigned Risk Plan established under authority of Section 35 of the Texas
Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act), covering liability arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or
issued for delivery in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in at least the limits described in the Texas Motor Vehicle
Safety-Responsibility A~t, under provisions prescribed by the Board, for the
protection of persons ihsured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover
damages from owners or operators of uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, or property
damage resulting therefrom.
(footnote omitted).
10. Plaintiff's policy stated in part: "(c) Any amount payable under the terms of this
insurance because of bodily injury or property damage sustained in an occurrence by a
person who is an insured shall be reduced by. . .(2) the amount recovered or recoverable
from the insurer of any underinsured motor vehicle." 617 S.W.2d at 835.
11. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1, § 5 (Vernon 1981) reads:
The underinsured motorist coverage shall provide for payment to the insured of all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from
owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury
or property damage in an amount up to the limit specified in the policy, reduced by the amount recovered or recoverable from the insurer of the underinsured motor vehicle.
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tied to recover."' 2 Relying on a Minnesota case construing a similar provision,1 3 the court reasoned that the amount paid by the tortfeasor's
liability carrier should be deducted from the underinsured motorist coverage. For this reason, the plaintiffs in this matter were entitled to receive
difference between $9,750 and the $10,000 underinsured cov$250.00, the 14
limits.
erage
Coverage. McManus v. Fidelity & Guaranty Underwriters,Inc. 15 involved
construction of a standard Texas homeowner's insurance policy. James
McManus's father owned a trail bike of which James was the primary user.
James had allowed draig Wooley to use the bike away from the McManus's premises when Wooley was involved in an accident with Mr.
Garcia. Suit was filed against Wooley and James McManus alleging that
McManus was guilty of negligent entrustment. Defense was tendered to
Fidelity & Guaranty Underwriters, Inc. because James was an insured
under the homeowner's policy. The carrier then filed a declaratory judgment action to determine its duty, if any, to defend. The trial court entered
judgment finding no duty to defend on behalf of the carrier.
The issue presented to the court of civil appeals was whether the negligent entrustment action arose out of that portion of the policy that stated:
"[tihe ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading or unloading of;
a recreational motor vehicle . . . away from the resident premises;
The court noted that although there was no Texas authority on
.. *..,6
point, other jurisdictions had addressed the question and there existed a
split of authority concerning the issue.17 Some jurisdictions have held that
the cause of action is not based upon operation, maintenance, or use but
18
upon the act of negligence and therefore a duty to defend does exist,
whereas other courts have held the provision to be clear, requiring no duty
to defend. 19
The court distinguished an earlier negligent entrustment case where the
entrustment occurred between insureds. 20 One of the distinguishing fac12. Id.
13. Lick v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 258 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1977).
14. 617 S.W.2d at 835. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1, § 2b (Vernon 1981) defines
an underinsured motor vehicle as:
an insured motor vehicle on which there is valid and collectible liability insurance coverage with limits of liability for the owner or operator which were
originally lower than, or have been reduced by payment of claims arising from
the same accident to, an amount less than the limit of liability stated in the
underinsured coverage of the insured's policy.
15. 615 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1981, writ granted).
16. Id. at 878.
17. See Cooter v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 344 So. 2d 496 (Ala. 1977); McDonald v.
Home Ins. Co., 97 N.J. Super. 501, 235 A.2d 480 (App. Div. 1967).
18. See McDonald v. Home Ins. Co., 97 N.J. Super. 501, 235 A.2d 480 (App. Div.
1967); Lalomia v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 35 A.D.2d 114, 312 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1970).
19. See Cooter v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 344 So. 2d 496 (Ala. 1977); State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGlawin, 84 Il.App. 3d 107, 404 N.E.2d 1122 (1980).
20. See Federal Ins. v. Forristall, 401 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1966,
writ reed n.r.e.).
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tors was that the negligent act complained of was the permission to use the
bike as opposed to the use of the bike itself.2 1 The court of civil appeals
resolved the issue in favor of the insured as follows:
Does then the exclusion of "ownership, maintenance, operation, use,
loading or unloading" encompass the negligent entrustment allegation
against the insured under the fact situation involved in this case? We
think it does not. The cause of action of negligent entrustment is a
separate and distinct cause of action, and in our case involves thepermission to use not the use of the vehicle. The third-party, Wooley,
was the one alleged to have negligently caused the accident and the
insured was not directly involved in the accident. The sole allegation
against the insured is negligent entrustment, and such allegation does
not involve the "ownership,22 maintenance, operation, use, loading or
unloading" by the insured.
Since in the court's view the negligence was in granting permission to use
the bike, the court23reversed the lower court finding and held that there was
a duty to defend.
CommercialStandardInsurance Co. v. Hartzog24 involved a determination of coverage under a standard truckman gross receipts policy. The
Hartzogs were injured when their automobile collided with a Houston
Truck Lines (HTL) truck that was on loan to Oilfield Company and being
driven by an Oilfield employee. Oilfield and HTL were trucking companies owned by the same individual but which were separate and distinct
corporations insured under two different types of policies. Oilfield was insured by Southern County under a standard, family type automobile policy covering specifically scheduled vehicles. HTL was insured by
Commercial Standard under a Texas standard truckman-gross receipts,
commercial type policy covering all vehicles owned by HTL, none of
which were specifically scheduled. The premiums were calculated according to the gross receipts of HTL for shipments made during the policy
period rather than on the per vehicle basis under the Oilfield policy with
Southern County. Suit was instituted by the Hartzogs against the two carriers based upon a personal injury judgment. Payment was denied by both
carriers. Southern County contended that Commercial Standard was primarily liable, while Commercial Standard contended an exclusion absolved it of liability. 25 The trial court found that the collision occurred
21. 615 S.W.2d at 879.
22. Id. at 881.
23. Id.
24. 619 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ filed).

25. The policy provided:
"PERSON INSURED

Each of the following is an insured under this insurance to the extent set
forth below:
(c) Any other person while using an owned automobile.
mission of the named insured, provided his actual operation.
scope of such permission.

. . with the per. . is within the
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while the truck was being used over a route the named insured was not
authorized by public authority to serve. That court entered judgment that
each of the carriers in amounts proportionate to
the Hartzogs recover from
26
their respective limits.

Commercial Standard contended on appeal that the exclusion applied
while either (1) the automobile was not being used exclusively in the business of the named insured, or (2) the automobile was being used over a
route not authorized to be served by federal or public authority. The
Hartzogs' position was that the provision in question was ambiguous and
required both that the injury occur while the automobile was not being
used in the exclusive business of the named insured and that it occur over
a route the named insured was authorized to serve by federal or public
authority. The court, in interpreting the exclusion, stated that the phrase
"not being used" inserted in the Commercial Standard exclusion modified
both clauses of the condition. 27 The policy stated in the negative an exclusion provision that has been interpreted in other jurisdictions to provide
coverage for others when using the vehicle exclusively in the business of
named insured and over routes authorized by federal or public authorthe 28
ity.
For this reason, the exclusion applied, and no coverage existed to
29
benefit the Hartzogs.
ProgressMarine v. Foremost Insurance Co. 30 involved an interpretation
of the clause "compulsory by law" in a protection and indemnity policy.
Progress Marine, Inc. brought suit against Foremost Insurance Company
for expenses incurred in removing the wreck of a jack-up workover barge
covered by a policy provided by Foremost. The case turned on whether or
not the removal of the rig was "compulsory by law" as provided in the
policy. 3' The district court determined that the removal, although prudent
on behalf of Progress Marine, was not compulsory by law. 32 The court of
appeals noted that interpretations of this clause had reached different results in different jurisdictions across the country. 33 The more restrictive
None of the following is an insured:
(i) any person or organization, or any agent or employee thereof, other
than the named insured ...engaged in the business of transporting property
by automobile ... for others under any of the following conditions:
(1) if the bodily injury or property damage occurs while such automobile
is not being used exclusively in the business of the named insured and over a
route the named insured is authorized to serve by federal or public
authority.
Id. at 418.

26. Id.
27. Id. at 419.
28. See St. Louis Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 283 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.W. Va.

1968); Johnson v. Angerer, 16 Ohio App. 2d 16, 240 N.E.2d 891 (1968).

29. 619 S.W.2d at 419.

30. 642 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1981).

31. The clause in the policy provided reimbursement of "[c]osts or expenses of, or indicated to, the removal of the wreck of a vessel named herein when such removal is compulsory by law." Id. at 817.
32. Id. at 817-18.
33. See, e.g., Seaboard Shipping Corp. v. Jocharanne Tugboat Corp., 461 F.2d 500 (2d
Cir. 1972); Continental Oil Co. v. Bonanza Corp., 511 F. Supp. 62 (S.D. Tex. 1980). •
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view seemed to require an order by a governmental body to warrant coverage. 34 The court expressed the view that "compulsory by law" should be
broader than merely a requirement of a preemptory order by an authoritative governmental agency. 35 Removal based upon an unreasonable apprehension of criminal or civil liability could not be considered compulsory
by law to invoke coverage. A fact question, according to the court, existed
as to the subjective belief of the insured regarding remova 3 6 and the resowhether or not the policy should be invoked
lution of this issue determined
37
provided.
coverage
and
Conditions. Baker v. GuarantyNationalInsuranceCo. 3 8 involved the duty
of the insured to forward suit papers. Baker brought suit against Guaranty
National Insurance Company based upon a judgment he had obtained
earlier against Guaranty's insured, Small. Baker had retained Small to do
a termite inspection when he purchased some realty. Small represented
that the realty was free of termites. After purchasing the property, Baker
learned that the representation was untrue and demanded damages of
Small. Guaranty, Small's carrier, investigated the claim and entered into
negotiations with Baker regarding settlement, which were unsuccessful.
Guaranty requested Small to notify them if suit was filed. Baker did file
suit, but Small made a conscious decision not to notify the carrier. On
May 8, 1979, judgment was rendered against Small. Guaranty's first notice of the suit and prior judgment was receipt of the suit papers in the
for failure of the insured to proabove lawsuit. Guaranty denied coverage
39
vide notice as required by the policy.
Baker took the position that under section 7A(a)(1) of the Texas Structural Pest Control Act 4° the condition in the insurance policy that required
34. 642 F.2d at 819.
35. Id. at 820.
36. The test as stated by the court was: "However, an additional inquiry must be made
as to whether the removal was performed as a result of a subjective belief on the part of the
insured that such was reasonably necessary to avoid legal consequences of the type contemplated by this policy." Id.
37. Id.
38. 615 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
39. Paragraphs 4(b) and 5 of the conditions of the insurance policy stated:
"4(b) If claim is made or suit is brought against the insured, the insured
shall immediately forward to the company every demand, notice, summons or
other process received by him or his representative.
5. Action Against Company: no action shall lie against the company unless, as a condition precedent thereto, there shall have been full compliance
with all of the terms of this policy."
Id. at 304.
40. Section 7A(a)(l) of the Texas Structural Pest Control Act provides:
(a) After February 29, 1976, the Board may not issue or renew a Structural
Pest Control Business License until the license applicant:
(I) files with the board a policy or contract of insurance approved as sufficient by the Board in an amount of not less than [$30,000] insuring him
against liability for damages . .. occurring as a result of operations performed in the course of the business of structural pest control to premises...
under his care, custody, or control.
TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 135b-6, § 7A(a)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
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the forwarding of suit papers was unenforceable. Baker contended that
the provision required a "no-notice" bond 4 as opposed to a policy of insurance. The court noted that generally a surety on a judgment bond need
not be given notice of suit or an opportunity to defend the suit before it is
bound by judgment. 42 Provisions in insurance policies that require the insured to provide notice of suit to an insurer, however, were valid and enforceable, and compliance with such provisions by the insured was a
condition precedent to coverage by the policy. 43 The court reasoned that
the language of the Texas Structural Pest Control Act merely required that
the applicant for a license have a policy of insurance not a surety bond,
and therefore the notice provision was valid and enforceable. 44 No coverage was provided by the policy because Small had failed to perform the
condition precedent.
II.

DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICE AND TEXAS INSURANCE CODE

Springfield v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Insurance Co.45 involved a class
action suit brought by H.J. Springfield and others against eight automobile
insurers. The plaintiffs claimed that they and others had been denied benefits afforded them by article 5.06-3 of the Texas Insurance Code. 46 In
addition, they sought damages pursuant to a claim under the Texas Decep41. In its opinion in Howze v. Surety Corp., 584 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. 1979), the Texas
Supreme Court held that no notice was required when a surety agreed to liability for a
specific judgment. The court in Baker contrasted such a no-notice bond with a general
liability insurance policy such as required by the Structural Pest Control Act. TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 135b-6, § 7A (Vernon Supp. 1982). The court found that the insurer,
unlike a surety under a no-notice bond, must be given notice when insuring for general
liability, before being bound by any judgments under the policy. 615 S.W.2d at 305-06.
42. See Howze v. Surety Corp. of Am., 584 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. 1979).
43. See Weaver v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 570 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. 1978).
44. 615 S.W.2d at 306.
45. 620 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. 1981).
46. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3(b) (Vernon 1981) provides:
"Personal injury protection" consists of provisions of a motor vehicle liability
policy which provide for payment to the name insured in the motor vehicle
liability policy and members of the insured's household, any authorized operator or passenger of the named insured's motor vehicle including a guest occupant, up to an amount of $2,500 for each such person for payment of all
reasonable expenses arising from the accident and incurred within three years
from the date thereof for necessary medical, surgical, X-ray and dental services, including prosthetic devices, and necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing and funeral services, and in a case of an income producer,
payment of benefits for loss of income as the result of the accident; and where
the person injured in the accident was not an income or wage producer at the
time of the accident, payments of benefits must be made in reimbursement of
necessary and reasonable expenses incurred for essential services ordinarily
performed by the injured person for care and maintenance of the family or
family household.
Id. art. 5.06-3(e) provides further:
An insurer shall exclude benefits to any insured, or his personal representative, under a policy required by Section 1,when the insured's conduct contributed to the injury he sustained in any of the following ways: (1) [c]ausing
injury to himself intentionally[;] (2) [w]hile in the commission of a felony, or
while seeking to elude lawful apprehension or arrest by a law enforcement
official.
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tive Trade Practices Act. 47 Plaintiffs claimed that the defendant insurance
companies had illegally limited coverage through use of the State Board of
Insurance's prescribed endorsement 243.48 They alleged a conspiracy between the insurers and the State Board of Insurance, which was made a
party after an earlier ruling.4 9 The trial court granted summary judgment
on behalf of the insurers, and the court of civil appeals affirmed.5 0 The
plaintiffs' allegation of illegality was that the coverage was limited solely to
losses on scheduled vehicles. The court noted that this portion of the complaint was correctly denied under the reasoning of an earlier precedent. 5'
The court observed that insurers are required to use endorsement forms
provided by the State Board of Insurance 52 and failure to do so would
subject them to action for revocation of their license. 3 The plaintiffs complained that the State Board of Insurance yielded to pressure and defined
"benefits for loss of income" in a nonstatutory manner. The definition
provided that "benefits for loss of income means eighty (80%) percent of
actual income lost because of disability resulting from insured bodily injury which prevents the injured person from performing the substantial
duties of his usual occupation."' 54 The plaintiffs claimed that an insured
should recover his entire loss of income, not merely a percentage of it as
provided by the endorsement approved by the State Board of Insurance.
The court stated that the Board was empowered to fix the rates based upon
the loss of income, but that it was not empowered to restate or limit the
statutory benefits. 55
The court refused the writ, finding that the insurance carriers were not
liable for damages for use of the endorsement that the law required them
to use. 5 6 The court specifically pointed out, however, that it did not necessarily approve the holding of the court of civil appeals that because the
State Board of Insurance was vested with rate-making power, it therefore
carried the greater and distinct power to reduce the coverage offered by
47. 620 S.W.2d at 558.
48. The Texas Insurance Board, pursuant to legislative authority, may prescribe the
form to be used for personal injury protection endorsement. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art.
5.06-3(0 (Vernon 1981).
49. See Allen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co., 567 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
50. Springfield v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co., 612 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
51. See Holyfield v. Members Mut. Ins. Co., 572 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1978).
52. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3(0 (Vernon 1981) provides:
The State Board of Insurance is hereby authorized to prescribe the form, or
forms, of insurance policies, including riders and endorsements, to provide the
coverage described in this article. The Board shall also prescribe the premium
rates under the provisions of this Subchapter A, Chapter 5, Texas Insurance
Code. Provided, however, the foregoing provisions relative to forms and rates
shall apply only to coverage written to comply with this article; such provisions shall not apply to other accident or health policies even though they
promise indemnity against automobile-connected injuries.
53. See id. art. 5.06.
54. 620 S.W.2d at 558.
55. Id.

56. Id.
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statute.5 7 The court stated that the remedy, if any, for the policyholders
would be through the administrative procedures provided in the Texas Insurance Code article 5.11.58
Humphreys v. Fort Worth Lloyds5 9 involved unfair claims practices.
Lloyds issued its homeowner's insurance policy to the Humphreyses.
While the policy was in force, an automobile driven by Chris Gholston
crashed into the Humphreyses' residence. The Humphreyses brought suit
against Gholston and subsequently settled with him and his insurance carrier and executed a formal release. The Humphreyses then sued Lloyds,
alleging that Lloyds committed certain unlawful and deceptive acts in disclaiming coverage and refusing to negotiate a reasonable settlement of
their loss. Lloyds filed special exceptions and an affirmative defense that
the Humphreyses failed to state a cause of action. The exceptions were not
ruled upon by the trial court. Thereafter Lloyds moved for a summary
judgment, arguing that no proper cause of action could be asserted for
wrongful claim settlement practices. The trial court granted the motion.
The court of appeals in its original opinion reversing the trial court held
that the legislature did not intend to exclude and did not exclude a proper
cause of action for wrongful handling of an insurance claim under article
21.21-2.60 The court withdrew its original opinion, although affirming its
reversal of the trial court, and concluded that the question was not properly before the court.6 1 In its second opinion the court recognized that the
question of whether or not pleadings failed to state a cause of action could
not be decided by a summary judgment proceeding in Texas and re62
manded the case for further proceedings.
Littljeld v. Hays6 3 involved the question of the constitutionality of article 5.82, section 4 of the Texas Insurance Code. 64 This section provides,
57. Id.; see 612 S.W.2d at 290.
58. 620 S.W.2d at 558-59. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.11 (Vernon 1981) provides:
Hearing on Grievances
Any policyholder or insurer shall have the right to a hearing before the
Board on any grievance occasioned by the approval or disapproval by the
Board of any classification, rate, rating plan, endorsement or policy form, or
any rule or regulation established under the terms hereof, such hearing to be
held in conformity with rules prescribed by the Board. Upon receipt of request that such hearing is desired, the Board shall forthwith set a date for the
hearing, at the same time notifying all interested parties in writing of the place
and date thereof, which date, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties at interest, shall not be less than ten (10) nor more than thirty (30) days after the date
of said notice. Any party aggrieved shall have the right to apply to any court
of competent jurisdiction to obtain redress.
No hearing shall suspend the operation of any classification, rate, rating
plan or policy form unless the Board shall so order.
59. 617 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
60. Id. at 790; see TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2 (Vernon 1981).
61. 617 S.W.2d at 790.
62. See generally Texas Dep't of Corrections v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Tex. 1974).
63. 609 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).
64. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 330, § 1, at 864. This article, enacted by the Texas Legislature in 1975, was repealed by 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 817, pt. 4, § 41.03, at 2064, effective
Aug. 29, 1977. Similar legislation enacted by the 1977 legislature is found in TEX. REV. CIv.
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among others items, a two-year statute of limitation on tort claims against
insured doctors.6 5 Sandra Littlefield was Dr. Hays's patient and on February 14, 1976, Hays performed surgery for the purpose of removing her
ovaries and fallopian tubes. After surgery, Hays told Mrs. Littlefield that
he had performed a "full pelvic clean-out." She continued to have pain
and was assured by Dr. Hays that all reproductive organs had been removed. Mrs. Littlefield sought other opinions and an ovarian tumor was
removed in late October 1976. Her suit was filed on October 23, 1978,
more than two years after her last visit with Dr. Hays on March 15, 1976,
but less than two years after the tumor was diagnosed and removed. Dr.
Hays pleaded that the provisions of article 5.82, section 4 of the Texas
Insurance Code applied and obtained
a summary judgment. On appeal
66
the court of civil appeals affirmed.
The court noted that article 5.82, section 4 of the Texas Insurance Code
applied only to those persons or hospitals covered by professional liability
insurance. 67 Moreover, the court recognized that the practical effect upon
adults was to abolish the "discovery rule" whereby the statute of limitations does not begin to run on certain medical malpractice claims until the
patient's discovery of the negligence. 68 Mrs. Littlefield complained that
the provisions of article 5.82, section 4 of the Texas Insurance Code violated the equal rights clause of the Texas Constitution 69 and the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution 70 since it applied only to
insured doctors, abolishing the discovery rule as to them but not to those
without insurance.
In finding the statute constitutional, the court viewed the statute under
the "rational relation test."' 7 1 The purpose of article 5.82, section 4 was to
establish standards and procedures for setting insurance rates for a class of
health care providers. In light of this group's historical problems with inSTAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982). Section 10.02 of the article provides
that those causes of action arising between the effective dates of arts. 5.82 and 10.01 shall be
brought pursuant to art. 5.12. § 10.02. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 330, §-4, at 865, states:
Notwithstanding any other law, no claim against a person or hospital covered
by a policy of professional liability insurance covering a person licensed to
practice medicine or podiatry or certified to administer anethesia in this state
or a hospital licensed under the Texas Hospital Licensing Law,. . . whether
for breach of express or implied contract or tort, for compensation for a medical treatment or hospitalization may be commenced unless the action is filed
within two years of the breach or the tort complained of or from the date the
medical treatment that is the subject of the claim or the hospitalization for
which the claim is made is completed, except that minors under the age of six
years shall have until their eighth birthday in which to file, or have fied on
their behalf, such claim. Except as herein provided, this section applies to all
persons regardless of minority or legal disability.
65. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws. ch. 330, § 4, at 865.
66. 609 S.W.2d at 630.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 629; see Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1977).
69. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 3.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

71. See Lubbock Poster Co. v. City of Lubbock, 569 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
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surance, the court found it proper for the legislature to focus on this group
and to provide standards for them that differed from standards and proce72
dures provided other insurers and insureds with different problems.
Since one of the primary considerations in any insurance rate setting process is the duration of the insurer's exposure to liability, it is within the
legislature's power to set an absolute time beyond which the insurer has no
exposure. 73 In concluding, the court stated that "an absolute time limit on
suits against insureds has a fair and substantial relation to the setting of
insurance rate standards and procedures and treats alike all persons who
74
have insurance or use insured entities. The statute is constitutional.
Although the court agreed with the plaintiff that the statute abolished the
discovery rule for insured doctors and not uninsured doctors, that distinction did not render the statute invalid. 75 The court refused to find a constitutional right to the discovery rule; rather it found that the discovery rule
was court-created, and thus could be abolished by the legislature as a necessary incident of regulating insurance rates. 76 Therefore, the court 77held
that Mrs. Littlefield's claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
Great Commonwealth Life Insurance Co. v. 0/ton State Bank 78 involved
a suit by a bank (Olton) to recover on a credit life insurance policy issued
to one of its customers, J.M. Kendrick. On February 22, 1977, Kendrick
signed a promissory master note for the sum of $90,000, payable to the
bank on or before January 15, 1978. The principal of the note was advanced in eleven installments credited to Kendrick's account from February 22 to September 12, 1977. Upon signing the note, the spaces indicating
a request for credit life insurance were left blank. At the time, Kendrick
had a credit life policy with Pennsylvania Life Insurance Company that
expired on July 1, 1977. In January 1976, Great Commonwealth had entered into an agency agreement with the bank authorizing the solicitation
of insurance on the lives of debtors of Olton. On the same date, a master
policy was issued insuring certain debtors of the bank. The master policy
contained language concerning eligible debtors79 as well as the effective
date of coverage.8 0 At the expiration of the Pennsylvania policy, Kendrick
72. 609 S.W.2d at 630.
73. Id.
74. Id.

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 607 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).

79. The policy provided:
"All natural persons of the class defined in the application for this Policy,
sixteen (16) years or over, and under the age of sixty-six (66) years at the time
of becoming insured hereunder, who are directly liable to pay or repay sums
of money to the Creditor over a period not to exceed sixty (60) months and
who furnish written and signed evidence of good health and eligible age as
required elsewhere in this Policy shall be eligible for insurance
hereunder .

Id. at 605-06.

80. The portion of the policy concerning effective dates of coverage stated that
"[i]nsurance on any Debtor insured hereunder with respect to a particular debt shall become
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requested credit life insurance, and the bank delivered to him a certificate
for level term with Great Commonwealth in the amount of $15,000 effective July 1, 1977, for one year. His bank account was debited for the
amount of the annual premium on July 1, 1977. No loan or advance was
actually made on that date, but five advances had been made previously
and six advances were made thereafter. Kendrick died on September 11,
1977, and the bank sought to collect the $15,000 from Great Commonwealth. The carrier refused, and this suit was commenced.
The carrier, appealing from an adverse lower court judgment, took the
position that the insurance issued to cover Kendrick's continuing line of
credit violated article 3.53, section 2 of the Texas Insurance Code.8 The
carrier argued that the definition of credit life insurance applied only when
an isolated loan transaction was contemplated as opposed to a general line
of credit such as Kendrick had in this case. The court refused to put that
limitation on the definition; instead the court held that the phrase "other
credit transaction" was broad enough to cover an open line of credit arrangement between debtor and bank.8 2 Additionally, the court stated that
no specific loan needed to be made on July 1, 1977, since at that time
Kendrick was directly liable to the bank and covered under the eligible
debtors' provision of the policy.8 3
III.

PROPERTY INSURANCE

Measure of Damagesfor "TotalLoss" by Fire. In Bennett v. ImperialInsurance Co. 84 the court rejected an attempt to circumvent or modify established rules on the proper measure of recovery for fire loss to real property.
Plaintiffs had purchased a dilapidated twenty-six-unit apartment building
in a depressed neighborhood in Dallas for $8,000. At the time of purchase
the apartments were not habitable because of deterioration and vandalism,
but plaintiffs were under an obligation to the city to bring the building into
compliance with building code standards. Plaintiffs purchased a fire policy
on the building in the amount of $120,000. The coverage amount was
based upon a per-square-foot replacement cost estimate, without regard to
the actual condition of the structure or prevailing market conditions.
About three months after the original purchase, without any repairs or
remodeling having been undertaken, portions of the building were heavily
damaged by fire. Although some portions were substantially untouched
by the fire, plaintiff sued for the face amount of the policy, contending that
the building was a "total loss" within the meaning of the valued policy
effective concurrently with the inception of such indebtedness to the Creditor or the effective
Id. at 606.
I..."
date of this Policy [2 January 1976], whichever is later .
81. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.53, § 2(B)(1) (Vernon 1981) defines credit life insurance
as "insurance on the life of a debtor pursuant to or in connection with a specific loan or
other credit transaction."
82. 607 S.W.2d at 606. The court noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court, in construing a similar provision, had held it broad enough to include an open line of credit. See Blue
Earth State Bank v. Crown Life Ins., 267 N.W.2d 177 (Minn. 1978).
83. 607 S.W.2d at 606.
84. 606 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ reed n.r.e.).
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law.8 5 The jury found that the building was a total loss, but the trial court
disregarded this finding as being unsupported
by the evidence, and ren86
dered judgment for a partial loss only.
Plaintiffs appealed, contending that the trial court erred in disregarding
the jury's finding of total loss because there was evidence (1) that the cost
of repair would far exceed the value of the building after repair, so that no
prudent owner would undertake restoration and (2) that the reduction in
value caused by the fire was substantial.8 7 The court of civil appeals affirmed, holding such evidence legally insufficient to support the total loss
finding.88 The court noted that in determining whether a structure was a
total loss under the statutory concept, the central question was whether
after the fire there remained a substantial remnant that a prudent owner
would use in restoring the building to its original condition.8 9 Under this
standard, it was immaterial whether a prudent owner would in fact elect to
restore the building; rather, the question was whether an owner who decided to restore would have a substantial remnant to use as the basis for
restoration.9" The undisputed evidence showed that usable remnants remained after the fire. The court of civil appeals therefore held that there
was no evidence to support the jury's finding of total loss, and that the total
loss finding was properly disregarded. 9 1 The court of civil appeals also
approved the trial court's charge to the jury on the measure of damages for
a partial loss, which was submitted as the difference between the fair mar92
ket value of the property immediately before the loss and after the loss.
Proofof Loss.

In Shelton v. United States FireInsurance Co.9 3 the court

85. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 6.13 (Vernon 1981), commonly known as the valued policy law, provides:
A fire insurance policy, in case of a total loss by fire of property insured,
shall be held and considered to be a liquidated demand against the company
for the full amount of such policy. The provisions of this article shall not
apply to personal property.
On and after January 1, 1951, the provisions of the preceding paragraph of
this article shall be incorporated verbatim in each and every Le insurance
policy hereafter issued as coverage on any real property in this State; and it
shall be the duty of the Board of Insurance Commissioners, by proper order
and procedure, to compel compliance with this statute.
The article mandates payment of the full face amount of the policy whenever there is a total
loss by fire to real property, without regard to the actual condition or value of the structure
before the loss. See Royal Ins. Co. v. McIntyre, 90 Tex. 170, 37 S.W. 1068 (1896); Superior
Fire Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 84 S.W.2d 810, 811 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1935, no writ).
86. 606 S.W.2d at 8: The pre-fire fair market value found by the jury was $28,900. Id.
at 10. While the jury's post-loss figure was not given in the opinion, all the witnesses had
agreed that the post-loss value was "nominal." Id. The partial loss measure of damages
submitted was the difference in value before and after the fire; one may infer therefore that
the trial court's judgment, disregarding prejudgment interest, was slightly less than $28,900.
Id. at 11.
87. Id. at 10.
88. Id. at 12.
89. Id. at 10.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 8.
92. Id. at 11.
93. 613 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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determined whether an adjuster's statements extended the ninety-one-day
time period for filing a proof of loss established in a Texas Standard Policy. 94 The plaintiffs purchased fire insurance from two companies upon
the contents of a leased building that they ran as a supper club. A loss
occurred, and although plaintiffs communicated after the loss with various
insurance adjusters, they failed to file a proof of loss within ninety-one
days as required by the policy. Plaintiffs contended that statements made
by the adjusters operated to extend the ninety-one-day period specified in
the policy. After a trial to a jury, the trial court rendered judgment for the
defendant insurers because plaintiffs offered no evidence to show compliance with the proof of loss requirement and no evidence that the adjusters
were in fact agents of the defendant insurers. The court of civil appeals
affirmed, agreeing that plaintiffs had wholly failed to establish any agency95
principal relationship between the adjusters and the defendant insurers.
The statements of the adjusters themselves were incompetent to establish
96
the alleged agency relationship.
Homeowners' Policy Theft Coverage. The current survey period includes
97
two homeowners' policy theft cases. In Herndon v. Sentry Insurance
plaintiff sued his homeowners' insurer under the "off premises coverage"
clause 98 for the value of two stolen rings. Coverage of one ring was con94. The Texas Standard Policy proof of loss provision reads:
Within ninety-one days after the loss, unless such time is extended in writing,
the insured shall render to this Company a proof of loss signed and sworn to
by the insured. Such proof of loss shall reveal to the best knowledge and
belief of the insured the following: the time and cause of the loss; the interest
of the insured and all others in the property, including any encumbrances
thereon; all contracts of insurance, whether valid or not, covering such property; the actual cash value of each item of property and the amount of loss
thereto; and by whom and for what purposes the building was occupied at the
time of loss.
In the absence of waiver by the insurer, compliance with this requirement is a condition
precedent to the insured's nght of recovery. Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Preston,
115 Tex. 351, 357, 282 S.W. 563, 566 (1926). The period within which a proof of loss may be
required must be reasonable, and may not be less than 90 days. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 5546 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
95. 613 S.W.2d at 539.
96. Id.
97. 615 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
98. The Texas Homeowners' Policy contains three types of first-party property coverages: (1) Dwelling (Coverage A), (2) Unscheduled Personal Property (Coverage B) and
(3) Scheduled Personal Property, if added by endorsement (Coverage C). In Herndon the
"off premises coverage" provision extended coverage for unscheduled personal property
(Coverage B) to personal property anywhere in the world, subject to certain limitations and
exclusions so that it was not limited to property located at the insured's dwelling location.
The off premises coverage provision read:
"OFF PREMISES COVERAGE-Subject to the provisions and conditions of
this policy and the exclusions and limitations therein, Coverage B also covers,
as additional insurance, unscheduled personal property (except property usually rented to others) owned, worn or used by the Insured, including members
of his family of the same household, anywhere in the world.
Such Off Premises Coverage, however, shall be limited to $1,000 or 10% of the
Limit of Liability applicable to Coverage B, whichever is greater ....
Id. at 250-51. Excluded from unscheduled personal property coverage under the terms of
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ceded because it was a specifically scheduled item. The insurer denied
coverage for the second ring based on a specific exclusion for unscheduled
personal property stolen from any dwelling of the insured other than the
one listed on the face of the policy. After purchasing the policy, the insured had moved from one apartment to another without notifying the
insurer, so that his dwelling at the time of the loss was not the one reflected
on the policy. The trial court rendered judgment for the insurer, enforcing
the exclusion as written. The court of civil appeals affirmed, rejecting the
insured's contention that the exclusion was ambiguous. 99
In Employers Casualty Co. v. Peterson 100 plaintiffs claimed the theft of
scheduled personal property. Plaintiffs had given jewelry to Shay with the
intention that Shay would sell it for them. Shay failed to return the jewelry upon demand, and plaintiffs sued their homeowners' insurer, claiming
a theft loss. The trial court rendered judgment for plaintiffs upon a jury
verdict. 101
On appeal the insurer challenged the trial court's definition of "control"
in submitting to the jury the question of whether the jewelry was under the
insured's control at the time of the loss. 102 The court of civil appeals overruled the point, holding that coverage was established as a matter of law
and the issue of control was immaterial since the insuring agreement extended to property "owned by or in the custody or control of the insured,"' 0 3 and ownership was undisputed.1°4 The insurer also contended
that the trial court had erred in excluding evidence of a similar claim made
by plaintiffs against another insurance company. The court of civil appeals held the evidence of another similar claim was properly excluded as
outside the scope of the pleadings, because the insurer did not plead fraud,
scheme, or plan on the part of the insured.10 5
"'MotorVehicle" and "Vehicle. " In Nicholson v. First PreferredInsurance
Co. 106 the court was asked to interpret the term "motor vehicle" within the
meaning of an exclusion in a Texas Homeowners' Policy. The Nicholsons
the policy was theft of "'personal property while on the premises of any dwelling (other
than the described dwelling) owned, rented, or occupied by an Insured except while an InId. at 251.
sured is temporarily residing therein; ......
99. Id. at 252.
100. 609 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
101. Id. at 583.
102. The issue submitted by the trial court and the jury's response were:
"Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that under the agreement between Fred L. Peterson and Nathan Shay, at the time of Fred L. Peterson's demand for the return of the diamond ring and diamond earrings,
such items of jewelry were not under the control of Fred L. Peterson?
Answer, 'They were not under the control' or 'They were under the control.'
ANSWER: 'They were under the control.'"
Id. at 587-88.
103. Id. at 585.
104. Id. at 588.
105. Id. at 585.
106. 618 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
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suffered a fire at their home and made a claim for damage to the dwelling
and its contents, including a dragster race car. The insurer denied the
claim, first on the basis that maintenance of the dragster race car voided all
coverage because it violated the insured's declaration that no business pursuits were carried on at the dwelling, and secondly, as to the race car in
particular,0 7 because damage to "motor vehicles" was specifically
excluded.1
After a trial to the court, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs for
all amounts claimed, except the dragster race car.10 8 The insured appealed, contending that the dragster was not a "motor vehicle" within the
meaning of the insurance policy; rather, the insured argued that a motor
vehicle was a machine intended for use upon public roads or highways,
and not one intended for racing purposes. 10 9 The court of civil appeals
rejected this argument, holding that the dragster was a "motor vehicle." 110
It approached the issue by reference to two settled principles for interpreting insurance policies that (1) terms not defined are to be given their common and ordinarily accepted meanings"I ' and (2) ambiguous terms are to
be construed in favor of coverage. 1 2 Rejecting certain statutory definitions of "motor vehicle" as determinative," 13 the court found the common
meaning of the term would include all self-propelled vehicles not operated
on stationary rails or tracks.' 14 The court noted that this definition was
held proper by the Texas Supreme Court in defining the same term as used
in the Texas Tort Claims Act.' ' The appellate court also rejected the
insurer's cross point relating to business pursuits, stating that no business
pursuits had been conclusively7 established. 116 Accordingly, the trial
court's judgment was affirmed."1
In Vetrano v. Aetna Life & Casualty"18 the insured sued his homeowners'
insurer under his unscheduled personal property coverage for a "loss by
vehicle." The insured while on a fishing trip had taken with him in the
boat several items of personal property. On the first afternoon of the trip,
the boat began taking on water and ultimately capsized. The insured sued
107. The insured's homeowners' policy excluded "motor vehicles" from coverage under

the unscheduled personal property provision. Id. at 562.
108. Id. at 561.
109. Id. at 562-63.

110. Id. at 563.
111. Id. at 562.
112. Id.

113. Id. at 563. The definition found in TEX. REv. Civ.

STAT.

ANN. art. 6675a-l(a),(b)

& art. 6701d, § 2(a), (b) (Vernon 1977) would extend only to vehicles used "upon a public
highway."
114. 609 S.W.2d at 563.
115. 618 S.W.2d at 563. The court has construed "motor vehicle" within the meaning of
the Texas Tort Claims Act, TEX. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon Supp. 1982)
stating that: "[c]ommon usage has made the phrase 'motor vehicle' a generic term for all
classes of self-propelled vehicles not operating on stationary rails or tracks." Slaughter v.
Abilene State School, 561 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. 1977).
116. 618 S.W.2d at 564.
117. Id.
118. 612 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
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for the value of the personal property lost, claiming he had suffered a "loss
by vehicle."" 9 Trial to the court resulted in a judgment for the insurer, on
the basis
that the boat was not a vehicle within the meaning of the
20

policy.'

On appeal the insured urged that a boat was a vehicle. The insurer took
the opposite position, and further argued that in any event there was no
evidence of a loss by vehicle because the boat did not cause the loss. The
court of civil appeals held for the insured on both issues,' 2' stating that the
term, according to its ordinary meaning, was broader than "motor vehicle"
or "automobile," and was at a minimum ambiguous as applied to a boat.
The term therefore, was construed liberally to include a boat. 122 With respect to the loss itself, the court held that there was some evidence that the
loss had been caused by a leak in the boat so as to render it a loss by
vehicle, rather than by some other cause. 123 The cause was reversed and
remanded for a new trial on the "loss by vehicle" issue.124
Insurable Interest. In Reynolds v. Allstate Insurance Co. 125 the court
pushed the concept of insurable interest under Texas law across new frontiers. The Reynoldses bought an undeveloped lot in Vidor, Texas, in 1964.
In the same year they contracted with Looney to build a house on the lot
and executed a mechanic's and materialman's lien note and a deed of trust
in favor of Looney. The house was completed and the Reynoldses took up
residence, but failed to make payments on the note. Looney foreclosed in
1970, buying the house himself at foreclosure. After the foreclosure, the
Reynoldses continued to live in the house, and began making payments to
Looney. The Reynoldses contended at trial that the payments were note
payments; Looney, however, contended that they were rent. In 1975 the
Reynoldses purchased fire insurance, and four months later the house was
destroyed by fire. At the time of the fire the Reynoldses had moved to
another residence, and the house where the fire occurred was occupied by
another family.
At trial the insurer contended that the Reynoldses had no insurable interest in the house, because they neither lived in the house nor owned it.
The Reynoldses contended that they did own the house, on the theory that
Looney's foreclosure five years before the fire was void because of certain
procedural irregularities. The case was tried to a jury, which in response
to special interrogatories found that Looney's foreclosure was void. The
trial court rendered judgment on the verdict for plaintiffs for the property
119. Under the policy, unscheduled personal property was insured against loss by twelve
specifically listed perils. One of the insured perils was "loss by ... aircraft and vehicles."
"Vehicles" was not defined in the policy. Id. at 691.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 692-93.
123. Id. at 693.
124. Id.
125. 629 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980), aI'd in part and rev'd inpart on rehearing, 633 F.2d
1208 (1981).
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damage and also for attorney's fees. 126
On appeal the insurer contended that it was error to permit the Reynoldses to attack collaterally Looney's foreclosure, five years after it occurred, for the purpose of establishing their legal title and hence their
insurable interest. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, upholding the trial court's
position.127 It observed that under Texas law collateral attacks are permit28
ted upon void titles, as distinguished from titles that are only voidable.1
The court also held that because insurable interest had been asserted as a
defense on the basis of Looney's foreclosure, the Reynoldses must be given
an opportunity to show proof that the foreclosure was void.129 The court
observed that Looney would not be bound by the judgment rendered in
30
the case and his title therefore would be unaffected.
Although the Fifth Circuit, in its original opinion, approved awarding
attorney's fees in a suit on an insurance contract,13 it reluctantly reversed
its position on rehearing, recognizing that suits against insurance companies upon policies are excluded by the literal language of the statute from
the scope of article 2226.132
Reynolds, a diversity case, was not based upon direct precedent from
Texas courts, and the question therefore arises whether Reynolds represents an accurate interpretation or prediction of Texas law. The most
closely analogous Texas case relied upon by the Reynolds court was Maryland Casualty Co. v. Davenport,133 in which the insurer sought unsuccessfully to deny plaintiffs insurable interest on the basis of a prior
foreclosure. Davenport held for the plaintiff on the insurable interest question, but not on the basis of the challenge to the foreclosure. 134 The court
specifically avoided adjudication of the validity of the foreclosure or of its
underlying lien, 135 and relied instead on the facts that plaintiff (1) had
bought and paid for the property in good faith, (2) had taken possession of
it, and (3) had contracted to rent it to another and, but for the fire, would
126. 629 F.2d at 1112.
127. Id.
128. Id.at 1115.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1116-18.
132. 633 F.2d at 1208-09. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1982)
contains the following exclusion:
The provisions hereof shall not apply to contracts of insurers issued by insurers subject to the provisions of the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act (Article 21.21-2, Insurance Code), nor shall it apply to contracts of any insurer
subject to the provisions of Article 3.62, Insurance Code, or to Chapter 387,
Acts of the 55th Legislature, Regular Session, 1957, as amended (Article
3.62-1, Vernon's Texas Insurance Code), or to Article 21.21, Insurance Code,
as amended, or to Chapter 9, Insurance Code, as amended, and each such
article or chapter shall be and remain in full force and effect.
See also Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Fraiman, 588 S.W.2d 681 (TFex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1979, no writ).
133. 323 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1959, no writ).
134. Id. at 617.
135. Id.at 617-18.
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have received a pecuniary benefit in the form of rent payments.136 Although factually similar in some respects. Davenport clearly does not support the reasoning or the holding of Reynolds.
Reynolds embodies questionable public policy for three reasons. First,
because it permits a collateral attack on a land title without joinder of the
record title holder, 137 it undermines the integrity of the adversary process.
The party with the greatest stake in the title question and the greatest
knowledge of the foreclosure facts is not called upon, under Reynolds to
participate in the trial or defend his record title. As a practical matter, it is
much easier to prevail against a party on any issue if that party is not
present to defend himself, or has no real interest in doing so. In the absence of the record title holder, the adversarial nature of the trial of issues
relating to foreclosure is subverted.
Secondly, the Reynolds holding creates an obvious risk of inconsistent
adjudications. A court might first hold a foreclosure void in the claimant's
suit against the insurance company, and then, in a second suit, hold it valid
in a suit by the claimant against the record title holder. Clearly, if the
record title holder (former lien holder) prevails against the claimant (former mortgagor) and defeats the challenge to the foreclosure, then the
claimant should be held to have no insurable interest, and should not be
permitted to recover insurance proceeds. The Reynolds rule, however, permits the insured to recover against the insurance company, while losing the
battle, or never undertaking the battle on the same issue against the record
title holder.
Thirdly, the Reynolds holding tends to increase the moral hazard to the
property by creating an incentive for the claimant to produce an intentional loss. If a claimant's only means, or easiest means, to realize a benefit from the property is through insurance, then he is given a financial
motive to produce the loss. Why should the claimant, having neither possession nor record title, initiate a judicial battle against the record title
holder, when a claim against an insurer, who is a stranger to the title dispute, offers the prospect of a prompt resolution of all problems through a
large cash payment?
McClellan v. Scardello Ford,Inc. 138 illustrates that in order to recover
upon an insurance policy, not only must the plaintiff have an insurable
interest in the property, but also the insurance policy must cover the plaintiff's interest. McClellan was to pay Scardello in cash for a truck when it
was delivered in Dalhart, Texas. Scardello located a truck in Tennessee
and arranged for it to be driven to Dalhart. En route, the driver became ill
and was forced to delay his trip by three or four days, during which time
Scardello's travel insurance expired. In order to shift the expense of addi136. Id. at 616-17.
137. The Reynolds opinion contains no indication whether the insurer objected to the
failure to join Looney, the record title holder, as could have been done under FED. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(7). The opinion does allude to the possibility of joining the absent party. 629 F.2d
at 1115 n.7.
138. 619 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
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tional insurance to McClellan, Scardello contacted not his own insurance
company, but Farm Bureau, McClellan's insurer. Farm Bureau agreed to
add an endorsement covering the truck, and McClellan was informed of
the arrangement, to which he assented. After the driver recovered from his
illness and continued his journey toward Dalhart, the truck caught fire and
was destroyed. McClellan refused to sign a document reflecting his ownership of the truck and made no claim to Farm Bureau for the loss.
Scardello did submit such a claim, but it was rejected by Farm Bureau.
The case was submitted to the trial court upon depositions, and judgment
was rendered in favor of Scardello against both McClellan and Farm Bureau for the value of the truck.
On appeal Scardello conceded that McClellan had not accepted the risk
of loss on the truck at the time of the fire, and abandoned his suit as to
McClellan. 139 Farm Bureau urged that its policy only protected McClellan's interest, if any, in the truck and not that of Scardello. The appellate
court agreed and held that Scardello, as a stranger to the insurance contract, could not assert rights under the policy; 140 the trial court's judgment
therefore was reversed, and a take-nothing judgment was rendered in
favor of Farm Bureau.141
Insurers' SubrogationRights. Three cases in the survey period deal with
insurers' subrogation rights. In Cloyd v. Champion Home Builders Co. 142
the insurer paid for a fire loss to Cloyd's mobile home and then, as subrogee, brought a breach of warranty suit against the manufacturer. The trial
court granted the manufacturer summary judgment based on a general release that Cloyd had executed in the manufacturer's favor. 143 The release
was undated, and there was no summary judgment evidence to show the
date of its execution. On appeal the subrogated insurer contended that the
trial court had erred in placing upon it, as plaintiff, the burden of showing
the manufacturer's knowledge or awareness of the subrogation claim at the
time the release was taken from Cloyd. The court of appeals disagreed,
holding that the release on its face barred the suit, and to avoid its effect,
the plaintiff-insurer had the burden of proving that the defendant had notice of the subrogation claim at the time the release was taken. 144 In the
absence of such evidence in the record, summary judgment for defendant
145
was affirmed.
In Landsdowne-Moody Co. v. St. Clair'"6 Landsdowne-Moody, the insured, leased a tractor to St. Clair. The tractor was stolen, allegedly
through St. Clair's negligence. The insurer paid to Landsdowne-Moody a
139. Id. at 596.
140. Id. at 597.
141. Id.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

615 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id. at 270.
Id. at 271-72.
Id. at 271.
613 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
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portion of its loss under a policy of insurance, and brought a subrogation
action against St. Clair. During the pendency of the subrogation action,
Landsdowne-Moody brought a separate, parallel action against St. Clair
for the amount of its loss, over and above the amount covered by insurance. In the latter case, Landsdowne-Moody was awarded judgment for
$361 as the amount of its uninsured loss, and a release was taken after the
judgment was paid. Thereafter, St. Clair pleaded the $361 judgment as res
judicata in the subrogation case, and obtained a summary judgment in the
trial court. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the
resolution of Landsdowne-Moody's claim would not bar the insurer's subrogation claim, since St. Clair had notice of both claims at the time of47the
judgment and release of judgment in the Landsdowne-Moody case.'
Rushing v. InternationalAviation Underwriters,Inc. held that an insurer,
subrogated to its insured's claim, was entitled to the benefits of its insured's
contractual right to recover attorneys' fees.' 48 Rushing leased an airplane
from Hi-Performance and negligently damaged it during a landing. International Aviation paid Hi-Performance's loss, and asserted a subrogation
claim against Rushing, both for the amount of the property damage to the
aircraft and for attorneys' fees. The attorneys' fees claim was made under
the terms of Hi-Performance's aircraft lease contract with Rushing. After
trial to a jury, the district court awarded International Aviation judgment
upon the verdict for the property149damage, but denied recovery for the attorneys' fees found by the jury.
Rushing appealed, arguing that International Aviation's claim was
barred under a Texas tax statute' 50 because Hi-Performance's corporate
charter, though valid (1) at the time the aircraft was damaged, (2) at the
time of payment by the insurer, and (3) at the time suit was filed, had
subsequently been forfeited due to Hi-Performance's failure to pay its corporate franchise tax. International Aviation, by cross appeal, sought recovery of the attorneys' fees as found by the jury. The court held for
International Aviation on both issues,' 5 ' stating that while International
Aviation stood in the shoes of its insured, vis-a-vis Rushing, its right to sue
became irrevocably fixed at the time suit was filed and could not be af147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 793.
604 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Id.
TEx. TAx-GEN. ANN. art. 12.14 (Vernon 1969) (repealed 1981) provided in part:
If the reports required by Articles 12.08, 12.09, and 12.19 be not filed in
accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, or if the amount of such tax
and penalties be not paid in full on or before September 15 of each year or,
when an initial tax report or payment is required, on or before ninety (90)
days after the time the initial report and payment is required, such corporation
shall for such default forfeit its right to do business in this State; which forfeiture shall be consummated without judicial ascertainment by the Comptroller
of Public Accounts. Any corporation whose right to do business shall be thus
forfeited shall be denied the right to sue or defend in any court of this State,
except in a suit to forfeit the charter or certificate of authority of such
corporation.
151. 604 S.W.2d at 244-45.
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fected by the subsequent forfeiture of the insured's corporate charter. 152
The court followed Safway Rental & Sales Co. v. Albine Engine & Machine
Works, 153 decided under Oklahoma law, on the attorneys' fees issue, reasoning that because of the contract between the parties, the defendant
would have been liable for attorneys' fees in the absence of insurance, and
therefore it should not be relieved of such liability because the plaintiff
carried insurance.1 54 The Rushing court also observed that a contrary
holding would only lead to an exaltation of form over substance, forcing
insurers to require insureds to pay attorneys' fees initially in suits involving subrogation claims, thereby allowing the insurer to obtain clear subrogation rights with respect to attorneys' fees upon reimbursing the
insured.1 55 The trial court's judgment was modified to include attorneys'
56
fees in favor of International Aviation, and otherwise affirmed.'
IV.

HEALTH, LIFE, AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE

MaterialMisrepresentationDefense. Lee v. NationalLife Assurance Co. 157
illustrates that a suit on life insurance policy may not be barred even
though the policy is issued in reliance upon false statements of fact knowingly made by the insured that are material to the risk. In Lee the Fifth
Circuit reviewed a summary judgment in favor of the defendant life insurance company. To apply for life insurance, the decedent, Lee, had signed
a two-page questionnaire application that was attached to and made a part
of the policy when it was issued. Lee represented that he had no personal
physician and that he had not suffered a heart attack, chest pain, or related
symptoms within five years of the application date. In fact, as shown by
the deposition testimony of Lee's doctors, he did have a personal physician
and had suffered a heart attack within the five-year period. Additionally,
he had continued to experience frequent chest pains and to receive treatment from his personal physician for his heart condition. Lee died of a
heart attack within four months of the date the policy was issued.
The application for the policy had been completed almost entirely in the
handwriting of a medical examiner, who had interviewed Lee and written
the answers on the basis of Lee's statements and then presented it to him
for his signature; a few answers however were in Lee's handwriting. The
examiner's affidavit reflected that, although he had no specific recollection
of his interview with Lee, the answers he wrote typically were not verbatim
transcriptions of the applicant's words, that some interpretation of the applicant's statements was generally required, and that he tried to answer in
favor of the applicant so that the insurance could be sold.
The district court granted summary judgment for the insurer, holding
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 241-42.
343 F.2d 129 (10th Cir. 1965).
604 S.W.2d at 244.
Id.
Id.

157. 632 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1980).
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that all elements of the material misrepresentation defense were established as a matter of law.' 58 On appeal, the beneficiary contended material
fact issues remained. The Fifth Circuit restated that the elements of the
misrepresentation defense under Texas law were:
(1) that a representation was made; (2) that it was false; (3) that the
misrepresentation was material to the risk; (4) that the insurer relied
on the misrepresentation in issuing the insurance policy; and (5) that
to deceive or
the misrepresentation was made willfully with the intent
59
to induce the insurance company to issue the policy.'
In reviewing Lee, the Fifth Circuit agreed that all elements were established as a matter of law, except the intent to deceive. 160 The court observed that under Texas law, when a signed application was attached to
and made a part of the policy, the insured was conclusively presumed to
have knowledge of and to have ratified any false statements contained in
it,161 and this conclusive presumption therefore established the elements of
misrepresentation and falsity. Further, the court concluded that the mis62
representations were clearly material to the risk and were relied upon.
In reviewing the intent question, the court noted (1) that the medical examiner had stated that he had written the answers in the application on the
basis of his interpretation of the applicant's statements, trying to answer in
favor of the insured, and (2) that although the portion of the application
completed by the medical examiner denied that Lee had a personal physician, in one of the answers written by Lee, Lee had given his doctor's name
and address. 63 This evidence, the court held, created a fact issue on the
intent in making the misrepresentations, and required reversal and remand
for trial. 64
Inception/Termination of Coverage Period. The survey period includes
four cases dealing with inception and/or termination of coverage. In
United Travelers Insurance Co. v. Perkins16 5 the court was asked to determine the effective date of a life insurance policy. On May 13, 1978, Mrs.
Perkins applied for membership in Lodge 10 of United Travelers Life Insurance Company, a fraternal benefit society organized into fourteen lodg158. Id. at 527.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 525.

161. Id. at 527. For this rule the court properly relied upon Odom v. Insurance Co., 455
S.W.2d 195, 199 (Tex. 1970).
162. 632 F.2d at 528-29.
163. Id. at 529. In its initial opinion the court interpreted Washington v. Reliable Life
Ins. Co., 581 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1979), as holding that the intent element could never be
established as a matter of law without "either a warranty that the facts contained in the
application are true or evidence of collusion between the applicant and the insurance agent."
632 F.2d at 528. On rehearing, on the basis of Mayes v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
608 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. 1980), the Fifth Circuit retracted this interpretation of Texas law, and
recognized that even without a warranty or evidence of collusion, the insured's intent to
deceive could be established as a matter of law. It reaffirmed its holding, however, that
intent to deceive was not shown as a matter of law in the case before it.
164. 632 F.2d at 529.
165. 611 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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es. All applicants for membership in the society were required to apply for
a policy of insurance with United Travelers, and Mrs. Perkins therefore
applied for a life insurance policy in the amount of $2,000 that named Mr.
Perkins as beneficiary. A provision of the application stated that the insurance would not take effect until the policy was actually delivered to and
accepted by the applicant during her life and good health. After completing the application, for which both Mr. and Mrs. Perkins furnished information, the Perkinses tendered, and the United Travelers' agent accepted,
the first year's premium. The agent issued a "Temporary Premium Receipt," on United Travelers' form. United Travelers was required under
state regulations, because of its limited reserves, to reinsure any policy in
excess of $1,000. The Perkinses, however, were not informed of this requirement or that the approval of the reinsurer was necessary before the
policy would be issued. The application was approved by United Travelers in June and sent on to its reinsurer, Republic National Life Insurance
Company of Dallas, for its approval. Republic, on August 25, approved
the reinsurance and United Travelers received notification of the approval
on August 28. On the same day, August 28, Mrs. Perkins died in an automobile accident. The policy was never issued, and a check refunding the
premium was sent to Mr. Perkins in October.
Mr. Perkins's claim for insurance proceeds was denied, and he brought
suit on several theories, including fraud, estoppel, and violations of the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Texas Insurance Code.' 66 Trial
was to the court, which rendered judgment for plaintiff for $2,000, finding
that defendant had falsely represented the coverage to be in effect on May
and estoppel were proved.167 No
13, 1978, and that the elements of fraud
68
deceptive trade practices were found.1
The court of civil appeals reversed and rendered judgment for United
Travelers, holding no evidence existed to support the trial court's finding
that defendant represented the policy to be in effect on May 13, 1978.169
The only evidence concerning the effective date was the provision in the
application that the policy would not be effective unless delivered while
the insured was alive and in good health. The court gave effect to this
provision.' 70 Relying on precedent,' 7' the court held that in the face of
such a stipulation, no delay in issuing the policy, whether reasonable or
166. Id. at 154-55. Perkins claimed false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices constituting a violation of TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16 (Vernon 1981), which incorporates § 17.46 of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 17.46(b)(l)-(3), (5), (7), (12) (Vernon Supp. 1982) are the particular provisions under
which Perkins sought recovery. In addition, he claimed that § 17.50 of the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act was also applicable. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(3) (Vernon
Supp. 1982).
167. 611 S.W.2d at 155.
168. Id. at 156-57.
169. Id. at 157-58.
170. The court stated that the Perkinses were charged with knowledge of the contents of
the clause because they had had an opportunity to read it and no evidence was presented
that Mrs. Perkin's signature was obtained by fraud. Id. at 157. Other cases have held an
applicant to be charged with knowledge of application provisions under similar circum-
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unreasonable, could operate as acceptance for formation of an insurance
contract 72 and the defendant could not be estopped to deny the existence
73
of a policy because no policy or contract was ever formed.
In DurhamLife InsuranceCo. v. Cole 174 the court was again faced with a
determination of the effective date of a life insurance policy. Cole's employer applied for a group policy on July 27, 1979, requesting an effective
date of August 1, 1979. The application contained a provision that no insurance would become effective without the written approval of the insurer. The written approval was given August 30, 1979. Cole was killed in
a motorcycle accident on August 17, 1979.
The understanding of the agent and the employer was that if all matters
pertaining to the application for insurance were received by the 10th of
August, the coverage would be effective from the preceding first of the
month. The application, together with all paper work necessary for the
insurance coverage including a check for the premium, was mailed to the
agent's office on July 30, 1979. The check was deposited on August 7,
1979. On August 20, 1979, the agent contacted Durham's office to determine the effective date of the policy. An unidentified person in the office
told the agent the effective date was August 1. The claim of Mrs. Cole, the
beneficiary, was rejected, and she brought suit.
The trial court sitting without a jury found for the plaintiff and rendered
judgment for the face amount of insurance plus a statutory penalty and
attorney's fees. 175 The court of appeals reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment, giving effect to the provision in the application stipulating
that only one method of acceptance should be controlling, namely written
approval of the insurer.1 76 It was undisputed that the only written approval given by the insurer was dated three days after Cole's death; therefore the court found no insurance in effect on the date of his death. The
court stated that as with any business contract, life insurance contracts do
not become binding until a complete agreement exists between the parties
evidenced by an offer and an acceptance. 77 Justice Dickinson dissented
on the ground that the trial court's finding of offer and acceptance was
supported by representations of the general agent, who had authority to
bind the company, and the statement of the unidentified person at the
agency that the coverage was in force as of August 1, 1979.178
stances. See Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (1962); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. W.L.
Macatee & Sons, 129 Tex. 166, 169, 101 S.W.2d 553, 556 (1937).
171. Brownwood Benevolent Ass'n v. Maness, 30 S.W.2d 1114 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1930, writ refd).
172. 611 S.W.2d at 156.
173. d.
174. 608 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
175. d. at 839. Payment of attorney's fees is provided for by TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art.
3.62 (Vernon 1981).
176. 608 S.W.2d at 840.
177. Id. at 839.
178. Id. at 840.
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In Baker v. Penn Mutual L!fe Insurance Co. 179 the court considered the
effect of an offer of reinstatement on a policy that had lapsed, in reviewing

a summary judgment for the defendant life insurance company. Baker
bought a life insurance policy in 1976, but failed to pay the required annual premium in 1979. The policy's grace period expired and thereafter a
notice of default and an offer of reinstatement, which by its terms would
expire on April 6, 1979, was sent to and received by Baker. On March 30,
1979, after the end of the grace period and before any action was taken by
Baker, he died in an accident. Penn denied coverage, and Baker's parents
brought suit as the beneficiaries of the policy. The court of civil appeals
affirmed summary judgment for the insurer.' 80 The court pointed out that
the original policy had expired and that the offer of reinstatement had not
been accepted at the date of the insured's death.' 8 I After the date of death,
of the insurer
theories of waiver and estoppel based on subsequent actions
82
could not retroactively create a life insurance contract.1
Group Lfe & Health Insurance Co. v. Brown 18 3 dealt with the issue of
whether an insurer had a duty to convert a group life policy to an individual policy at the policyholder's request. Mrs. Tatom was a teacher covered

by a group life and health policy that contained a conversion privilege
entitling the insured to convert his coverage to individual policies when he
was no longer a group member. The life insurance conversion privilege
specified that the insured must make written application and pay the first
premium payment within thirty-one days after termination of employment
with the group. Mrs. Tatom retired at the age of sixty-five and requested
that her life and health insurance be converted to individual policies, but
failed to make any written application or pay any premium for the life
coverage. Only the health insurance coverage was reissued as an individual policy. Upon Tatom's death, the executrix of her estate sued the insurer on theories of negligence and estoppel. The trial court rendered
judgment for the estate upon a jury verdict.
The court of civil appeals reversed and rendered, determining that the
insurer had no duty to issue a life insurance policy to Mrs. Tatom because
she had not complied with the application and premium payment requirements in the group policy.18 4 Without a duty running from the insurer to
Mrs. Tatom, liability could not be predicated upon negligence. 185 The
court held that there was no evidence to support findings on the elements
by the insurer
of estoppel, including the elements of false representation
86
and of detrimental reliance by Mrs. Tatom.1
179. 617 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).

180. Id. at 816.
181. Id. at 815-16.
182. Id. at 816.
183. 611 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ).
184. Id. at 480-81.

185. Id. at 480.
186. Id. The court restated the elements of estoppel:
In order to recover on the basis of equitable estoppel it must be shown:
(1) a false representation or concealment of material facts, (2) made with
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Benefciary Designation Changes. In PrudentialInsurance Co. of America
v. Burke 187 the contractual obligation of a life insurance company to
change the beneficiary of a life insurance policy and the recoverability of
attorney's fees in a suit on an insurance policy were decided. Burke filed
suit to force Prudential to change the beneficiary of his life insurance policy from his former wife to his new wife and he also sought attorney's
fees.' 88 The policy had been purchased with community funds during the
marriage to the first Mrs. Burke. Prudential argued that it could not make
the requested change without the ex-wife's consent because she had a community property interest in the eventual proceeds of the policy, of which
she could not be divested by the unilateral act or request of Mr. Burke.
Trial upon stipulated facts resulted in judgment for the plaintiff, both defees. The
daring his right to a beneficiary change and awarding attorney's
89
judgment.1
court's
trial
the
affirmed
appeals
civil
of
court
The appellate court stated that Prudential was correct in asserting that
the former Mrs. Burke had a community property interest in the policy
and its proceeds, when payable; even so, the company had no right to refuse to make the change, and no standing to assert the rights of the former
Mrs. Burke. Noting that the change would only be effective as to Mr.
Burke's one-half community property interest in the policy, and would not
cut off the former Mrs. Burke's rights, the court held that Prudential was
obligated to make the requested change of beneficiary.' 90 In considering
the award of attorney's fees, the appellate court initially reformed the trial
court's judgment by deleting the award, holding that article 2226 of the
Texas Revised Civil Statutes' 9 ' clearly excluded from its scope policies issued by insurers subject to the Texas Insurance Code.' 92 The court reversed this ruling on rehearing, and held that notwithstanding the
language of the statute, which appears to exclude suits on insurance policies, 193 the purpose of the legislature was to exclude from the statute "only

Id.

knowledge, actual or constructive of those facts, (3) to a party without knowledge, or the means of knowledge, of such facts, (4) with the intention that it
should be acted on, and (5) reliance by the party to whom the representation
was made, to that party's detriment.

187. 614 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana), writ re'd nr.e. per curiam, 621
S.W.2d 596 (Tex. 1981).
188. Burke sought attorney's fees under TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN.art. 2226 (Vernon

Supp. 1982), which provides for recovery of attorney's fees in"suits founded on oral or
written contracts" when certain notice requirements are met.
189. 614 S.W.2d at 850.
190. Id. at 849.
191. TEx. REv. Cir.

STAT.

ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1982).

192. 614 S.W.2d at 850.
193. The statute on its face appears to exempt suits on insurance policies issued by insurers subject to regulation under the Texas Insurance Code. It reads:
The provisions hereof shall not apply to contracts of insurers issued by insurers subject to the provisions of the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act (Article 21.21-2, Insurance Code), nor shall it apply to contracts of any insurer
subject to the provisions of Article 3.62, Insurance Code, or to Chapter 387,
Acts of the 55th Legislature, Regular Session, 1957, as amended (Article
3.62-1, Vernon's Texas Insurance Code), or to Article 21.21, Insurance Code,
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those claims against insurance companies where attorney's fees were already available by virtue of other specific statutes."' 194 The court did not
explain how it discovered this purpose and the holding is in clear conflict
with an earlier case decided by the Houston court of civil appeals. 195 The
supreme court, in a per curiam opinion, stated that the court of civil appeals had correctly decided the case, and refused Prudential's application
for writ of error with the notation "no reversible error."' 96 The lower
court's holding, with respect to attorney's fees, was not disturbed nor directly commented upon in the opinion.
In Anderson v. Anderson 197 the insured's heirs brought suit against the
insured's step-brother to set aside two change of beneficiary designations
on life insurance policies executed by the insured prior to his death. Having discovered he had terminal cancer, the insured created a trust for the
benefit of his two minor children to be funded from the proceeds of two
life insurance policies and gave his step-brother a power of attorney. After
a lengthy stay in the hospital, the insured moved to the home of his stepmother and step-brother. The insured subsequently executed two beneficiary designations that made all life insurance proceeds payable to the stepbrother, and also executed a new will. The trust for the minor children
was left unfunded because the new will provided that only proceeds from
policies designating the estate as beneficiary were to be used to fund the
trust. The jury found that the beneficiary changes had been prepared by
the step-brother knowingly contrary to the insured's instructions and had
been signed by the insured without awareness of the altered or incorrect
designations. Judgment was rendered on the jury verdict for the heirs, setting aside the designations naming the step-brother as beneficiary. The
court of civil appeals affirmed, holding that the circumstantial
evidence
98
presented adequately supported the jury's verdict.'
Scope of Coverage and Exclusions from Coverage. Several cases in the
survey period dealt with the scope of coverage under a policy and various
as amended, or to Chapter 9, Insurance Code, as amended, and each such
article or chapter shall be and remain in full force and effect.
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
194. 614 S.W.2d at 850.
195. In Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Fraiman, 588 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ), the court held:
Article 2226, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1978) states that its provisions
are not applicable to insurance policies issued by insurance companies subject
to the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (Article 21.21-2 Insurance
Code). Since this is a fire insurance company it falls within article 21.21-2,
section 7, and thus is not within the provisions of article 2226.
The Fraiman holding was followed in Reynolds v. Allstate Ins. Co., 629 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir.
1980), rehearinggrantedinpart and denied in part, 633 F.2d 1208, 1209 (1981).

196. 621 S.W.2d 596, 597 (Tex. 1981). The court specifically reserved for future decision
the question of "the extent of a spouse's community property interest in an unmatured insurance policy, purchased with community property funds, but not mentioned in the property
division of the divorce decree." Id.
197. 618 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ).
198. Id. at 929, 931.
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exclusions from coverage. In Gulf Atlantic Life Insurance Co. v. Disbro199
Disbro and his wife filed a claim with Gulf Atlantic for medical expenses
under a major medical expense policy. Gulf Atlantic denied coverage for
a portion of the expenses on the basis of an exclusion for amounts covered
"by or through the Federal government. ' ' 2°° The expenses in question had
been paid by Medicare. The case was tried upon an agreed statement of
facts, and the trial court rendered judgment for plaintiff. On appeal the
court of civil appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the insurer, enand rejecting the insured's argument that
forcing the exclusion as written,
20
the exclusion was ambiguous. '
Huse v. FidelityInterstateLife Insurance Co. 202 was a suit on a life insurance policy in which the court gave effect to the policy's worker's compensation exclusion. The insured was killed in an automobile accident during
the course and scope of his employment. The named beneficiary's claim
was denied on the basis of a provision that excluded any accident or loss
for which payment would be received under any workers' compensation
law. 20 3 The beneficiary contended that since the worker's compensation
benefits were paid to the decedent's minor daughter and not to her, the
exclusion was inapplicable. The case was submitted pursuant to an agreed
statement of facts in the trial court, where judgment was rendered for defendant. On appeal the court of civil appeals affirmed, stating that absent
to
a statute prohibiting such an exclusion, the parties could freely contract
2°
exclude coverage for losses also covered by worker's compensation. 4
In American NationalInsurance Co. v. Woodward20 5 the insured sued to
recover benefits payable under a mortgage disability policy issued by
American. Woodward had obtained a loan for the purchase of real estate
and simultaneously purchased a group mortgage repayment disability policy. The policy excluded coverage for any disability caused by or resulting
from "'[a] pre-existing illness, disease or physical condition for which the
debtor [insured] received medical diagnosis or treatment within the six
months preceding the effective date of the debtor's [insured's] coverage.' "206 Having become disabled as the result of an arthritic condition,
Woodward made claim on the policy. Coverage was denied, and suit was
defended on the basis of the preexisting disease exclusion. The trial court
rendered judgment for Woodward upon a jury finding that Woodward's
arthritis was not a condition for which she had received medical diagnosis
or treatment within six months before the effective date of the coverage.
On appeal, the court recognized that the insured had the burden of prov199. 613 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ).

200. Id. at 512.
201. Id. at 513.
202. 605 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ).
203. Id. at 352. The exclusion stated that "this policy does not cover any accident or loss,
fatal or non-fatal, caused by or resulting from.., injury for which compensation is payable
under any Workmen's Compensation Law." Id. n. 1.
204. Id. at 352-53.
205. 614 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
206. Id. at 201-02.
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ing the inapplicability of the pleaded exception. The court of civil appeals
read the provision to exclude from coverage only illnesses for which the
insured had received priortreatment and affirmed the trial court's holding,
having found the evidence adequately supported the jury's verdict. 207
In Gro7lth v. Continental Casualty Co. 208 the federal district court correctly placed on the plaintiff the burden of disproving the applicability of a
pleaded exclusion in a group life policy. The insured, a pilot for Delta
Airlines, took off in a private plane on October 28, 1975, for a destination
in Florida and was never seen again. The insured's father, the beneficiary
under the policy, had the insured declared legally dead, 20 9 and sought the
proceeds of the policy. Continental denied coverage, contending that the
death of the insured fell within the policy's exclusion for loss caused by
"riding in any aircraft. ' 21 0 Suit was filed, and the case was submitted to

the court on stipulated facts. The court held there was coverage unless the
pleaded exclusion for loss from "riding in any aircraft" applied. 21' There
was no evidence of cause of death; therefore the burden of proof was of
determinative importance. Under Texas law, when an exclusion is
pleaded and thereby put in issue, the insured has the burden of proving
since
that it is not applicable. 21 2 Judgment was rendered for the insurer
21 3
the insured could not present any evidence on cause of death.
In Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Shelton 2 14 Mr. and Mrs.
Shelton, insureds under a major medical and medical expense policy,
brought suit against Connecticut General to recover the expenses from
Mrs. Shelton's restorative surgery to reverse the effects of a prior tubal
ligation performed while Mrs. Shelton was married to her first husband.
She subsequently remarried and opted to reverse the procedure. The original operation was performed on a doctor's advice that she and her prior
husband could not conceive a healthy child due to incompatible Rh factors
in their blood. The Sheltons, however, had compatible Rh factors. The
policy provided coverage for medical expenses "recommended by a physician as essential for the necessary care and treatment of an injury or sickness."2 15 The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts, and the
trial court rendered judgment for plaintiffs. On appeal Connecticut General's sole point was that there was no evidence to show that the expenses
were for necessary care or treatment of an injury or sickness. The court of
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 203.
506 F. Supp. 1332 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
Id. at 1333.
The policy excluded loss caused by "riding in any aircraft, except to the extent per-

mitted and specifically described in Part VIII 'Air Coverage."' The air coverage section
provided coverage only if an insured was "riding as a passenger in any aircraft properly
licensed to carry passengers" or ,operating or performing duties as a crew member of any
Id. at 1334.
aircraft owned, or operated by Delta [sic] .....
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1335; see Sherman v. Provident Am. Ins. Co., 421 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. 1967);
Hardware Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 393 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. 1965).

213. 506 F. Supp. at 1337.
214. 611 S.W.2d 928 (rex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).

215. Id. at 930.
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civil appeals sustained the point and reversed, reasoning that under general principles of law, insurance is intended only to protect against a risk
or chance of loss and not a matter over which the insured has control or
decision-making power. 21 6 The elective surgery of the insured was not2 17a
loss of a fortuitous character, such as the policy was intended to cover.
In Hopfer v. CommercialInsurance Co. 218 the court dealt with a suicide
exclusion. Mrs. Hopfer, widow of the insured, sued Commercial to recover the face value of the policy insuring the life of her husband, who had
died as a result of a gunshot wound. The policy contained a suicide exclusion that the trial court, based on a jury's verdict, held to be a bar to recovery.2 19 Mrs. Hopfer, on appeal, contended that the trial court erred in
placing the burden of negating suicide upon her. The court of appeals
affirmed, holding that the burden of proof was properly placed on the inand that the evidence was sufficient to supsured to negate the exclusion,
220
port the jury's verdict.
In Connecticut GeneralLife Insurance Co. v. Tommie22 1 the court held
the evidence sufficient to support jury findings that the death of the insured
was not the result of suicide and was accidental. 2 22 The evidence showed
that the insured put a rope around his neck with the intent to tighten it to a
degree necessary to reduce the amount of oxygen supplied to his brain and
thereby to increase the intensity of orgasm during masturbation. Medical
testimony indicated that the insured had transvestite tendencies and that
his sexual practices were unusual, but that they were not such as would
constitute a disease in either the medical or the ordinary sense of the word.
Faced with adverse jury findings, Connecticut General argued on appeal
that the evidence proved conclusively that the insured intentionally injured himself and that it was only the extent of the injury that was unintentional, but the court of civil appeals held the jury verdict was supported by
the evidence. 22 3 The court approved the trial court's admitting into evidence opinion testimony from medical experts on the cause of death, even
though such testimony was based in part on hearsay.224 The court noted
that the testimony was not based wholly on hearsay and that the hearsay
ordinarily relied upon by the experts in their profescame from sources
225
practices.
sional
In Smith v. Tennessee Insurance Co. 226 the court of civil appeals reversed
a judgment for the defendant insurer based upon a verdict of suicide, because the trial court improperly admitted opinion testimony based wholly
216.
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606 S.W.2d 354 ('ex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
Id. at 355.
Id. at 357-58.
619 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
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Id. at 203-04.
Id. at 203.
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on hearsay. 227 Testimony of the county medical examiner and a member
of his staff indicated that the insured committed suicide. The doctors'
opinions were based wholly on hearsay data, gathered by support staff,
that was not introduced into evidence. The medical examiner had never
personally examined the body. If the data on which the witness relied had
been introduced into evidence through the investigators' testimony and
used in formulating proper hypothetical questions, the opinion testimony
would have been properly admissible. 228 The opinion testimony should
229
have been excluded; therefore the case was remanded for a new trial.
In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Koch 230 the court was asked to determine
the meaning of the term "legally separated." The policy afforded life insurance coverage for employees anid il.eir eligible dependents. Eligible dependents were defined to include "your husband or wife, unless you were
legally separated or divorced." 2 3 1 The evidence showed that Koch and his
wife were living apart and that the wife had filed for divorce at the time of
her death. During the pendency of the divorce, the court had granted interlocutory orders setting aside a residence to Mrs. Koch and dividing the
household goods and furnishings. The jury found that Koch and his wife
were legally separated at the time of her death.232 The trial court entered
judgment for Koch, notwithstanding the verdict, on the theory that under
Texas law there was no status of legal separation for a husband233and wife
before the marriage was dissolved by a final decree of divorce.
The court of civil appeals held that a status of legal separation was ambiguous as applied in Texas, since Texas law recognized no formal legal
separation. 234 Under settled rules of interpretation, the court stated that
ambiguous portions of insurance policies were to be interpreted and construed liberally in favor of the insured. The language of a policy was susceptible of more than one reasonable construction, and the court applied
Accordthe construction that favored the insured and permitted recovery.
23 5
ingly, the trial court's judgment for plaintiff was affirmed.
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